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WHY

MISSISSIPPI

SHOULD REFORM ITS PENAL CODE
Judith J Johnson]
I. INTRODUCTION

The Mississippi Penal Code was determined at the turn of this century to be
the fifty-second-worst penal code in the United States. 2 As much as Mississippi
is often used to being- and is even proudly defiant for being-ranked low on
national scales, this is an issue about which we should be deeply concerned. A
well-drafted penal code is crucial because it is at the core of the primary value of
justice. While we are experienced with being ranked last in many situations,
often unfairly, the criticism of the Mississippi Penal Code is accurate. Although
many of the cited defects are ameliorated by court opinions, it is not desirable
that the penal law should be so dependent on numerous sources outside the
code. 3
The legislature established the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Committee in
1993 to improve the administration of justice. 4 The Advisory Committee
established the Criminal Code Consulting Group [hereinafter referred to as the
Committee] to suggest revisions to the penal code. The Committee has been
meeting since 1996 and is finally reaching the end of its charge and will present
its proposals to the legislature in the foreseeable future. The legislature will have
to decide whether to take up this important and daunting challenge to rise from
the fifty-second ranked penal code to a more respectable position. More
important than a mere ranking, the Committee proposals will improve the
administration of the criminal justice system.
When the Committee was first appointed by the Judicial Advisory
Committee, the main concern expressed regarded sentencing disparity. The
Committee was charged with reforming the criminal statutes to remedy this
disparity, along with other issues identified by criminal code reform in other

1. Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. I want to thank Michelle Sultan, the current
research assistant for the Committee, for her assistance. I also want to thank Michael Primack for additional
assistance. In addition, I want to thank all my research assistants and all of the members of the Committee who
have provided valuable support over the years.
2. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and Usman Mohammed, The Five Worst (andFive Best)
American CriminalCodes, 95 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.3 (2000). Being fifty-second sounds impossible;
however, the evaluation by noted criminal law experts added the federal code and the D.C. code to their
assessments. Id.
3. See infra discussion accompanying notes 144-45. Mississippi does not have a penal code,
denominated as such, but most of the criminal laws are concentrated in MISS. CODE ANN. Title 97, and the
Committee principally dealt with those laws.
4. MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 9-21-1

(1993 Cumulative Supplement) (current version at MISS CODE ANN.

§ 9-

3-69 (2017)). The Judicial Advisory Study Committee was eliminated in 2018. H.B. 949 (2018). The Criminal
Code Consulting Group (which I will refer to hereinafter as the Committee) is now operating under the
auspices of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
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jurisdictions. With regard to sentencing disparity, many criminal statutes in
Mississippi provide a range of decades as a possible sentence, such as one year
to thirty years. 5 This allows one defendant to be sentenced to spend most, if not
all, of his life in prison, while another may get only a one-year sentence for the
same conduct. 6 Another obvious problem with Mississippi criminal law is the
often-vague definitions of the conduct prohibited.7 Because the chief distinction
between criminal and civil offenses is a criminal state of mind, it is especially
concerning that states of mind are often lacking or confusing in many
Mississippi statutes.8 Yet another major problem is that Mississippi has a
patchwork of often disorganized criminal statutes that do not relate to each other,
with no definitions that apply to the overall criminal code. 9
To avoid
exacerbating this problem, the Committee is recommending a comprehensive
reform of the principle criminal statutes. The Committee's proposals, if adopted,
would make substantial progress in addressing these and other problems with the
Mississippi Code, as explained in this article.
This article is the first in a series of articles that will present the case for
penal-code reform and explain the Committee's rationales. This series of articles
is intended to replace comments, which the Committee did not write, although
there are extensive comments to the Model Penal Code, on which these
proposals are based.
This first article will introduce and explain the Committee's process. In
addition, this article will begin the explanation of the important areas of change,
starting with states of mind and homicide. Future articles will explain the other
groups of crimes and other issues that the Committee has addressed.
In this article, Section II will explain the methodology of the Committee's
work; Section III will explain the Model Penal Code because it was used as the
basis for the Committee's proposals; Section IV will discuss the criticism of the
current code; Section V will explain how the reform would improve two
important areas of the Mississippi Code: state of mind and homicide. Section VI
will conclude.
II. COMMITTEE METHODOLOGY

The Committee consists of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
legislative drafters, and law professors.10 The Committee has laboriously moved

5. See infra note 60.
6. See infra discussion accompanying notes 60-64 and 89-92.
7. See infra discussion accompanying notes 67-71.
8. See infra discussion accompanying notes 78-85.
9. See infra discussion accompanying notes 72-76.
10. Current committee members: Professor Judith J. Johnson, chair; Professor Matthew Steffey,
reporter; Judge Donna Barnes; Patrick Beasley; Judge John Emfinger; Greta Harris; Mary Katherine Lindsay;
Caryn Quilter; Professor Ronald J. Ryclak; Kathy Sones; Alison Steiner; and Ed Snyder.
Original Committee Members: Professor Judith Johnson, chair; Professor Matthew Steffey, reporter; Judge
Fred Banks, co-chair for some period of time; Judge Robert Gibbs, who also co-chaired for some period of
time; Judge Robert Bailey; James Craig; Judge Bobby DeLaughter; Rusty Fortenberry; Tom Fortner; Buddy
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through the most important parts of Title 97 of Mississippi Code of 1972, which
contains the principal criminal statutes, trying to develop a penal code that is
both more coherent and comprehensive than current law.11 The Committee has
only dealt with the substantive criminal law, leaving for another committee the
reform of the corrections system, which is also needed.
I was appointed to chair the Committee in 1995, so the first question is why
it has taken so long for the Committee to complete its work. Other states have
no doubt spent a good deal of money and have had paid staffs of attorneys and
research assistants. 12 Being faced with very limited resources, we have been
benefitted by many public-spirited members. 13 Our Committee is all-volunteer
and has worked on one statute at a time at its monthly meetings.
Why did this effort take so long? The Committee is all-volunteer, as noted,
working without a staff and with only one student research assistant at a time,
paid for by Mississippi College School of Law. As our reporter, Professor Matt
Steffey, has often said, "of good, cheap, and fast, we could only have two, good
and cheap, not fast."1 4 As noted, other states have been able to accomplish the
task more quickly, but not with such economy.1 5 More importantly, we could
not have paid for the experience and expertise that we have been able to garner
for our effort, as illustrated by the members of the Committee, current and
former. 16
At each of the monthly meetings, we compare the Mississippi law to the
relevant Model Penal Code provision and propose changes in the Mississippi law

McDonald; Rob McDuff; Bilbo Mitchell; Al Moreton; Professor Ronald J. Rychak; Ed Snyder; Kathy Sones;
Judge Leslie Southwick; Gwynetta Tatum; Frank Trapp; Senator Bennie Turner; Judge Frank Vollor; Professor
Carol West; and Amy Whitten.
Others who have served on the Committee: Dewitt Allred, Judge George Carlson, Judge Virginia Carlton,
Judge Kay Cobb, Andre DeGruy, Judge Oliver Diaz, David Dykes, Chris Klotz, Katie Lawrence, Frank
McWilliams, Margarette Meeks, Faye Peterson, Clarence J. Richardson, Judge Larry Roberts, Judge Keith
Starrett, Robert Taylor, Shondra Taylor-Legget, and Philip Weinberg.
Others who attended to help with specific issues: Drs. Phillip Meredith and Reb McMichael, Professor Cecile
Edwards, Judge John Hudson, and Dean Emeritus Jim Rosenblatt. Judge Tom Broome also provided valuable
input.
11. The Committee meets in Jackson at the Mississippi College School of Law. The law school has
furnished the meeting space and paid the research assistant. In addition, the law school also furnished lunch for
the committee for several years under the leadership of Dean Jim Rosenblatt. The Committee is very grateful
for the support of the law school during all these years. The Administrative Office of the Courts has also
furnished valuable support to the committee by sending out meeting notices and providing lunch for the
committee for several years.
12. See, e.g., District of Columbia Government, FY 2017 ProposedBudget andFinancialPlan, 6 A Fair

Shot, June 22, 2016, at C-169 (2017) (with a budget of over $700,000 per year for the Criminal Code Reform
Commission) (approval recorded in FY 2017 Approved Budget, Changes to Date, and Revised Budget), both
available at https:/cfo.dc.gov/page/annual-operating-budget-and-capital-plan.
Other states have used state commissions and state resources. Conversation between Caryn Quilter (committee
member) and Jessica Sanders (Alabama) on June 5, 2018 and Rob Kepple (Texas) on June 20, 2018.
13. See supra note 10.
14. Conversations with Professor Matthew Steffey (on numerous occasions).
15. See District of Columbia Government, supra note 12.
16. See supra note 1.
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to reflect the needs of the state and the need for uniformity. The Committee is
currently reviewing all the proposals it has adopted in preparation for compiling
the results for presentation to the Mississippi Legislature.
The Committee based the proposed revisions on the Model Penal Code,
which virtually all states that have reformed their penal codes have used.1 7 Thus
it would be helpful to explain the Model Penal Code at this point.
III. THE MODEL PENAL CODE

The Model Penal Code [hereinafter the MPC or the Model Code] was
developed by the American Law Institute1 8 [hereinafter ALI] and published in
1961 as a model for states to reform their penal codes, which most states have
done. 19 The Model Code serves as a measure of uniformity among the several
codes. The Model Code has extensive comments that the Committee used in its
considerations, as well as the experience of many states that have reformed their
penal codes. As opposed to the restatements of the law, which were designed to
digest the law and be consulted by judges as a guide to decision-making, the
Model Code was designed to be adopted as an actual code by the states, with
modifications to suit their particular situations. 2 0 The drafters of the Model Code
reviewed centuries of development of the common law and statutory law to
formulate rules and general principles and develop a body of work that could be
adopted by legislative bodies. 2 1
The ALI recognized the need for penal-code reform, as have the states that
have reformed their penal codes, because of the confusing and inconsistent
random statutes adopted over the past 200 years. Most states retained the
common-law crimes recognized in England roughly before the Revolutionary
War. Then state statutes were overlaid on the English common law and its
confusing interpretations by common-law judges, which were followed by

17. Gerald E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?):The Challenge of the Special

Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998).
The Model Penal Code is among the most successful academic law reform projects ever attempted. In
the first two decades after its completion in 1962, more than two-thirds of the states undertook to
enact new codifications of their criminal law, and virtually all of those used the Model Penal Code as
a starting point. Id.
The American Law Institute is in the process of making some changes to the MPC, notably in the area of sex
crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.0-213.11 (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2015). The
original draft of sex crimes was considered outdated and unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Gerald E. Lynch, Revising

the Model Penal Code:Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 230-31 (2003). The Committee also had
to completely redraft the sex crimes sections, but that is a story for another day. The core provisions of the
Model Code, however, have stood the test of time and there would be little to gain from changing them. See
Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, supranote 17, at 297.
18. The American Law Institute was organized in 1923 to improve and clarify the law. The ALI
consists of distinguished lawyers, judges, and professors. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in

the United States: The Model PenalCode, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968).
19. See Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code, supranote 17, at 297.

20. Id. at 220.
2 1. Id.
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interpretations of state judges making common law for the state. 2 2
Two-thirds of the states reformed their penal codes using the Model Code
as the basis for their reforms. 23 This effort occurred during the first twenty years
after the MPC was published and has peaked thereafter. The states with the
worst-ranked penal codes failed to conduct a review using the MPC. 24 Thus,
although Mississippi comes late into the process, it may draw from the
experience of many other states that have reformed their penal codes. 2 5
In addition to establishing some uniformity among criminal codes and
crimes, virtually all American law students are introduced to the Model Code
and its version of general definitions, as well as many of its crimes and
defenses. 26 Also, courts and commentators frequently cite the Model Code as
persuasive authority. 27 The Mississippi Supreme Court has cited the Model Code
favorably, 2 8 and the Mississippi Legislature has based some of its codifications
on the Model Code. 29
Finally, the drafters wrote extensive comments,
explaining the provisions of the Model Code in detail. Although the comments
will not be part of the legislation, lawyers, judges, and courts often rely on the
comments to interpret the Model Code provisions.
The Committee chose not to publish separate comments, other than this
series of articles, but to rely instead on the Model Code comments where
appropriate. This set of articles will serve to some extent as comments and will
be approved by the Committee before publication.
The Model Penal Code is divided into four parts. 30 The first covers general
principles governing liability. 3 1 This is the most important contribution of the
MPC, which defines such important issues as criminal intent, inchoate crimes
(such as attempt and conspiracy), as well as mens rea defenses (such as
justification). 3 2 The second part defines specific offenses, 33 such as criminal
homicide 3 4 and theft. 35 The third part of the Model Code governs the process of
treatment and correction, 3 6 and the fourth part organizes the various groups
responsible for corrections. 37 Our Committee dealt only with the first two parts,
leaving for another committee the work of studying, and possibly reforming, the

22. Id. at 225.
23. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, supra note 17, at 297.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 297-98.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 604 So. 2d 280, 292 (Miss. 1992) (approving of Model Code definition

of serious bodily injury).
29. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-7

(2017) (simple and aggravated assault).

30. Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1428.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE Part I. General Provisions. (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Article 3 Principles of Justification.
Part II. Definition of Specific Crimes
at Article 210 Criminal Homicide.
at Article 223, Theft and Related Offenses.

36. Id. at Part III. Treatment and Correction.
37. Id. at Part IV. Organization of Correction.

112

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37:2

corrections process.
Another important contribution of the Model Code is to divide crimes by
seriousness and to punish them accordingly. As will be discussed further below,
a guiding principal of the Model Code is that no one should be punished severely
for a true crime unless he has a requisite mental state. 3 8 A true crime is one
involving a degree of moral condemnation and usually contemplates
imprisonment. 39 For this reason, the punishment for the crime should be
commensurate with the defendant's state of mind, as well as the severity of the
offense. The Model Code recognizes three degrees of felonies, 40 which the
Committee expanded to four degrees. 4 1 Thus, murder is a felony in the first
degree, 4 2 along with aggravated forms of rape, 4 3 robbery 44 and kidnapping. 4 5
Manslaughter is a felony in the second degree, 4 6 along with non-aggravated
forms of rape, 47 robbery, 48kidnapping, 49 and others. Negligent homicide is a
felony in the third degree, 50 along with non-aggravated burglary, and so forth.5 1
38. See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02

cmt. at 235-36 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

39. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(b) (5th ed. 1985). By true crime, I mean a
crime that is malum in se, inherently evil in itself, as opposed to crimes that are merely malum prohibitum, not
inherently wrong, but wrong only because they are prohibited by statute. Id.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
41. Minutes of the Consulting Grp. on Miss. Criminal Code Revision, (Sept. 12, 2014) [hereinafter cited
as Minutes] (on file with author).
In the footnotes, I cited the statutes the Committee is proposing, leaving in the changes made to the Model
Penal Code, indicated by underlining, which are additions, and strikeouts, which are deletions. Statutes cited in
the text do not have the changes indicated. Also, I treated homicide and mens rea statutes differently, as noted
in those section. See infra note 157. The proposed sentencing scheme for felonies is as follows:

§ 6.06.

Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony

A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment, as follows:
(a) in the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term the minimum of which shall be fixed by the
Court at not less than twenty
y::::e_
::e
than: ten years, and the maximum of which shall be
life imprisonment;
(b) in the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term the minimum of which shall be fixed by
the Court at not less than ten o
ea
r : o: et yars, and the maximum of which shall be

+ettwenty 'ears;
(c) in the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term the minimum of which shall be fixed by the
Court at not less than 1 year. at not l It one yea nor more t :: years, and the maximum of
which shall be-fi4e-ten years;
(d) in the case of a felony of the fourth degree, for a term the minimum of which shall be fixed by the
Court, and the maximum of which shall be five years.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

MODEL PENAL CODE
Id. § 213.1(1).
Id. § 222.1(2).
Id. § 212.1.
Id. § 210.3(2).
Id. § 213.1(1).
Id. § 222.1(2).
Id. § 213.1(1).
Id. § 210 (2).
Id. § 221.1(2).

§ 210.2(2) (AM. LAW INST.

1985).
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felonies in the

fourth degree, 52 along with others. 53
The Model Code recognizes misdemeanors 54 and petty misdemeanors. 5 5
The Model Code also classifies regulatory offenses as violations, 56 which are not
considered true crimes and thus not criminal. 57 The Committee adopted the
violation category, 58 but divided misdemeanors into four classes, A-D. 59
Classifying crimes appropriately will improve the current code, but why go
through this lengthy and disruptive process? The following section will explore
the criticism of the current code.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE CURRENT MISSISSIPPI CODE

As noted in the introduction, the main problem identified by the Judicial
Advisory Committee when we began our work was sentencing disparity. Our
Committee was charged with reforming the criminal statutes to remedy that,
along with other issues that other states had faced in reforming their criminal
statutes. There are statutes in Mississippi that allow for a sentence of from five
years to life, for example. 60 There are many others that have a very wide range
in the penalty. 6 1 Others, such as the manslaughter-penalty statute, punish serious
conduct the same as much less serious conduct. 62

A defendant who would

otherwise be guilty of murder could get a two-year sentence because he was

52. Minutes, supranote 41 (Sept. 12, 2012).
53. See, e.g., less serious forms of the following: Hindering Prosecution, Child Pornography, Aiding
Another in Committing a Crime. See full chart in the appendix assigning penalties to the various crimes the
Committee has covered.

54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
55. Id. § 1.04(4).
56. Id. § 1.04(5).
57. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 39.
58. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Aug. 8, 2014).
59. See id. (March 9, 2012); see also id. (September 12, 2014). The sentencing scheme for
misdemeanors and violations is as follows:

§ 6.08
(a) Sentences of misdemeanors shall be a definite term of imprisonment in the county jail or to hard labor for
the county, within the following limitations:
(1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year.
(2) For a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months.
(3) For a Class C misdemeanor, not more than three months.
(4) For a Class D misdemeanor, not more than one month.
(b) A violation is punished by a fine of not more than -4 $250.

60. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-79 (2017). (Robbery using deadly weapon.)
61. See, e.g., id. § 97-3-53. (Kidnapping. The penalty for kidnapping is from one to thirty years for the
conduct of confining a person unlawfully.) The Committee proposes to penalize the conduct by a sentence of
from one year to life but breaks the crime of unlawful confinement into three crimes with greater punishments
for more aggravated conduct. The defendant could get life for confining a victim to use as a hostage or for
ransom, but unlawful confinement with no aggravating factors could be punished up to a year in prison. See
Minutes, supra note 41 (June 8, 2018).

62. MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-25

(2017).
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acting in the heat of passion, while someone who was guilty of the less-serious
form of manslaughter by culpable negligence could get twenty years. 63 A broad
range in sentencing also allows an unfair disparity among the courts for the same
conduct. 64
Sentencing disparity is not the only problem with the Mississippi criminal
law, and several other problems have been identified in addition. The best
analysis of the problems with Mississippi law was a national study that resulted
in an article classifying the Mississippi Criminal Code as the fifty-second worst
code in the United States. The article was written by noted criminal law scholar
Paul Robinson, along with others. 65 The authors used five criteria for ranking
the codes. 6 6
The first criterion was whether the code comprehensively states the conduct
that it is prohibiting, requiring, or permitting. 67 While Mississippi did not score
at the very bottom on this criterion, it was toward the bottom. 6 8 The authors
considered such things as whether the state still recognizes non-codified,
common law crimes, which Mississippi does; 69 whether terms are adequately
defined; 7 0 and whether there is sufficient guidance regarding affirmative
defenses. 7 1
The second criterion was "effectiveness in communicating rules of
conduct." 72 Mississippi ranked last on this criterion in part because of its
"confusing, convoluted, or arcane language in setting out offenses," 7 3 its random
organization of crimes, 74 and its lack of a simple description of defenses. 7 5
63. Id.; see infra Section V.B.2.b.
64. By adopting the proposed scheme of four degrees of felonies and four classes of misdemeanors,
there will be less possibility for sentencing disparity. Each degree or class has a limited range of punishment
and comports with crimes of similar seriousness. See supra discussion accompanying notes 38-59.
65. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 1. Paul Robinson is currently the Colin S. Diver Professor of Law at
the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
Paul Robinson is one of the world's leading criminal law scholars. A prolific writer and lecturer,
Robinson has published articles in virtually all of the top law reviews, lectured in more than 100 cities in 33
states and 27 countries, and had his writings appear in 13 languages.
A former federal prosecutor and counsel for the US Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures, he was the lone dissenter when the US Sentencing Commission promulgated the current federal
sentencing guidelines. He is the author or editor of 15 books, including the standard lawyer's reference on
criminal law defenses, three Oxford monographs on criminal law theory, a highly regarded criminal law
treatise, and an innovative case studies course book.
/www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/phrobins/
Professor Robinson was joined by Michael T. Cahill, who was a federal circuit court law clerk at the
time, and by Usmann Mohammed, who was a student at the University of Michigan.
66. Robinson, supra note 2, at 3.

67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 24-25.
69. See Michael Hoffheimer, Murder and Manslaughter in Mississippi: UnintentionalKillings, 71

MISS. L.J. 35, 124-26 (2001).
70. Robinson, supra note 2, at 25.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

29.
25.
34-35.
32.
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Mississippi was especially cited for its overlapping offenses, with homicide,
which will be discussed more fully below, as the example. 7 6
The third criterion was the "comprehensiveness and accessibility of the
principles of adjudication." 77 Mississippi received a zero on this criterion, as did
five other states.7 8 The fact that Mississippi does not specify and/or define
culpability requirements in many of its crimes is a major failing, which will also
be discussed below. 79 In addition, Mississippi fails to define excuses and nonexculpatory defenses 8 o or general provisions, such as causation.8 1
The fourth criterion was "accuracy in imposing liability." 82 Mississippi
was again cited as an example of a state that criminalizes harmless or trivial
conduct. 83 Also included as a measure under this criterion is whether there is a
default standard for mens rea when not specified in a statute. 84 There is no
general mens rea statute in Mississippi. This will be discussed more fully
below. 85
In addition, the worst codes, including Mississippi, have unconstrained
felony murder rules, as discussed more fully infra.86 In other words, death during
any felony could be murder.
Also cited was Mississippi's misdemeanor
manslaughter rule, which is also unconstrained and could theoretically be
imposed for any misdemeanor, discussed more fully below. 87 Another factor in
which Mississippi was deficient was that there is limited codification of excuse
and justification defenses. 88
The fifth criterion was accuracy in "grading and punishment." 8 9 Mississippi
ranked last on this criterion because of inconsistency in grading offenses and
failure to recognize or to make appropriate distinctions, 90 citing as the worst
example Mississippi's theft statutes, 9 1 which will be discussed in a later article.
As noted earlier, sentencing disparity was the main problem identified by the
Judicial Advisory Committee. 92
Because a complete description of the Committee's work would be
impossible in one article, I will limit my discussion to two important subjects,
mens rea and homicide. I will address first the definitions of criminal states of
76. Id. at 36. See Section V.B.1.b; V.B.2.b.
77. Id. at 38.
78. Id.
79. See infra Section V.A.
80. Robinson, supra note 2, at 40.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 41.
at 44.
at 44-45.
at 47-48.

85. See infra Section V.A.
86. See infra Section V.B.1.ii.
87. See infra discussion accompanying notes 257-60.
88. Robinson, supra note 2, at 50.

89. Id. at 51.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 59.
92. See supra discussion accompanying notes 60-64.
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mind, or mens rea, noted above as one of the Mississippi Code's major defects. 93
V. PARTICULAR AREAS OF CHANGE

A. Mens Rea

One of the hallmarks of a criminal code is to address the need to punish
people who act with evil intent. The Model Code emphasizes that, for serious
offenses, the justice system should look at the defendant's actual belief, not just
what a reasonable person would have believed. 94 The Model Code does employ
an objective "reasonable person" standard, but only for less serious offenses.
More importantly, to be guilty of a true crime, 9 5 the defendant must fall
substantially below the standard or norm of a reasonable person. 96
The most important and most difficult issue is defining criminal intent so
that it will serve as notice to a potential offender and be helpful in explaining the
concept to judges and juries, who must decide whether the offender acted with
the requisite criminal intent. The Model Code reduced criminal intent to a few
simple concepts that may be generalized to apply to all crimes. 97 This may be
the most important contribution the Model Code has made to criminal justice.
As noted earlier, Mississippi has many statutes that have no identifiable criminal
intent or that have confusing and contradictory words denoting criminal intent,9 8
some examples of which are discussed below. 99
Mississippi was not alone in this. Before the Model Code, "[flor centuries,
the approach to mental components of crimes had been a quagmire of legaleseboth in Latin and in English-though legislators and judges had vainly attempted
to give some coherence to concepts of wrongfulness."oo The Model Code
replaced the archaic verbiage such as "willful, wanton, mind regardless of social
duty," with concepts of purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal
negligence.101 These words were accompanied by definitions that judges and
jurors can understand and apply.1 02
1. The Model Penal Code and The Committee's Proposals
The Committee agreed with the important philosophy of the Model Code
that no one should be liable for any true crime unless he acts with one of the
states of mind prescribed by the Code.1 03 For this reason, except as otherwise
93. See supra discussion accompanying notes 79-85.
94. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 235-36 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
95. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1435-37; see also LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supranote 39.

96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
97. See id. § 2.02.
98. See supra discussion accompanying notes 78-84.
99. See infra Section V.A.2.b.
&

100. Ronald L. Gainer, Remarks on the Introduction of CriminalLaw Reform Initiatives, 7 J.L. ECON.

POL'Y 587, 588 (2011).
101. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) cmt. at 242-44 (AM LAW INST. 1985).
102. See id. § 2.02(2).
103. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1435-37. In addition, the conduct must be based on a voluntary act,
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which is defined as well. Id.
I have handled the proposed statutes differently throughout this article. In some cases, the statute is just too
long to include in the text, as in the case with the mens rea statute, so I put it in the footnote and paraphrased it
in the explanation. Shorter statutes, like manslaughter and negligent homicide, I put in the text, along with
putting the full statute in the footnotes.
This is the entire mens rea statute as proposed by the Committee. The italicized portions indicate changes that
the Committee made from the Model Code:

§ 2.02
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in § 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense
unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or criminally negligently, as the law may require, with respect
to each material element of the offense.

(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he
believes or hopes that they exist.

(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct
is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Criminally Negligently.
A person acts criminally negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of
his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
(3) Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material
element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto, except when the only culpabilityprescribedby law defining an
offense is criminalnegligence, criminalnegligence shallsuffice to establish all materialelements.

(

(4) Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge. When the law provides that
criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person
acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also
is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element,
such element also is established if a person acts purposely.
(6 (5) Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose Is Conditional. When a particular purpose is an element of
an offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition negatives the
harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
49) (6) Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability. When knowledge of the
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noted, the Committee agreed with the Model Code's proposals regarding states
of mind.
The most obvious and arguably the most serious state of mind is purpose.
So, if the defendant has "the conscious object to engage in the conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result," he is acting purposefully.1 0 4 In the case of a
defendant who intends to kill, for example, he is acting purposely with regard to
the result of death.10 5
The next most culpable state of mind is knowledge, which is very close to
purpose. Both purpose and knowledge require knowledge of the attendant
circumstances; however, knowledge does not require that the result (if an
element of the crime) be intended, just that "it is practically certain that his
conduct will cause such a result." 106 If the defendant intends to bum a building,
knowing that there are people in the building who cannot get out, he may not
have the object of killing, but he knows the result is practically certain to
occur. 107

The next most culpable state of mind is recklessness. Recklessness is
defined as conscious disregard of "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that the
result will occur. 108 If the defendant drives eighty miles per hour through a
school zone, he is reckless with regard to killing someone if he is aware that he is
driving through the school zone and that there may be children in the vicinity.
The risk required is defined as "a gross deviation of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe" in his situation. 10 9
The amount of risk is arguably the same for the least serious criminal state
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
(8) (7) Requirement ofWillfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be
committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense,
unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.
(9)(8 Culpability as to Illegality of Conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness or criminalnegligence as to
whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the
elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so
provides.
(4-} (9) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on
whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or criminally negligently, its grade or
degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any
material element of the offense.
March Minutes 2018.

104. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). See id.
105. Unless otherwise noted, the Committee accepted the Model Code provision discussed without
significant changes. See Wechsler, supranote 103.
106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM LAW INST. 1985). See Wechsler, supra note 103.
107. Knowledge is very close to the state of mind described by the Model Code as "reckless with
extreme indifference to the value of human life." See, e.g., Section V.B.1.b.(i). In the example of the
defendant burning a building, knowing there are people inside who cannot get out, the defendant would be
extremely reckless in burning a building where people are likely to be, even if he does not know they are there
and cannot get out. See Wechsler, supranote 18, at 1435-39 and LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 39, §
5.2 for a discussion of the distinctions among the various states of mind.
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM LAW INST. 1985). See Wechsler, supranote 103.
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM LAW INST. 1985). He may even be reckless with extreme
indifference to the value of human life in this situation. See, e.g., supra Section V.B.1.b.(i).
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of mind, "negligence."
The main difference between recklessness and
negligence is that the defendant is aware of the risk for recklessness, and for
negligence, he should have been aware of the risk, which is a "gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe" in the
defendant's situation.1 10 If the defendant was driving through a school zone at
80 miles per hour, then he would be criminally negligent even if he was
consciously unaware of the risk because a reasonable person would have been
aware.
The drafters of the Model Code used the term "negligence," but then
emphasized in the definition and the comments that ordinary negligence should
never be sufficient to commit a true crime, 1 11 as noted earlier. Ordinary
negligence only requires a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would be aware of, not a gross deviation, which is more in keeping with
gross negligence or criminal negligence.11 2 The Committee considered that
using the term "negligence" and defining it to mean "criminal negligence" could
only lead to confusion, and to a court's interpretation of the elements of the
crime to require only ordinary negligence. Thus, the Committee, along with
other jurisdictions, chose to denominate this type of culpability as criminal
negligence.113
The Model Code does recognize that there is a place for strict liability,
which does not require any mens rea, but grades those offenses as violations, not
true crimes. 1 14 These offenses are only punished by fines or other civil penalties
and do not give rise to other legal disadvantages attending criminal
convictions. 115 The Committee agreed with this position.
2. Mississippi
a. How the Committee Proposalswill affect the Mississippi Code's mens
rea requirements.116

How will all this affect the current Mississippi Code? There are criminal
statutes scattered throughout the Mississippi Code. For that reason, the proposed
changes contained in proposed Section 2.02 will be made principally with regard
to Title 97 of the Mississippi Code, which deals with major crimes. 1 17 Even in
that title, there will be statutes that have not been altered by the proposed
changes. With regard to those, the mens rea terms proposed by the Committee
will not necessarily supplant other terms indicating mens rea. However, section
110. CompareMODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with id.
111. See id. § 2.02(2) cmt. at 241-42.
112. See id.

§ 2.02(2)(d).

113. Minutes, supranote 41 (Dec. 8, 2006).
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Examples of strict liability crimes would
any violation of the traffic laws, not paying a toll on a road, and evasion of taxes. These are regulatory offenses
that do not involve true crimes. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supranote 39.
115. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1439.
116. The Committee adopted the Model Code provisions described, unless otherwise indicated.
117. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Aug. 8, 2014).
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2.02(3) provides that if there is no mens rea requirement expressed in the statute,
each element is established "if the person acts purposely, knowingly, or
recklessly."' 18
For crimes that are in the nature of regulatory offenses, termed "violations"
by the Model Code,11 9 the state of mind provisions would not apply.1 20 In other
words, for those Mississippi statutes that do not require an express state of mind,
Section 2.02(3) would apply, unless the statute clearly intends that there be no
mens rea requirement; in that case, the crime is a strict liability offense. 12 1
As noted below, willfulness is often the required state of mind. 12 2
Although the Model Code does not use the term, the term is used in state
criminal codes, including Mississippi's, with varying definitions. 123 Section
2.02(7) provides that if the statute requires willfulness, the requirement is
satisfied if the defendant acted knowingly.1 24 Since willfulness is a problematic
term that may mean anything from purpose to criminal negligence, this will
provide some clarity to the law. Even with other terms not covered, the
Committee believes that the standardization of definitions will be helpful in
interpreting those terms.
In addition to the definitions, there are other subsections that clarify mens
rea requirements. The original version of Section 2.02(4) applies any mens rea
term expressed in the statute to all material elements of the crime.1 25 The
Committee chose not to adopt this subsection, rather preferring that the state of
mind for any elements with no specified state of mind be covered by Section
2.02(3) and that recklessness will suffice for these elements. 12 6 However, if the
crime requires only criminal negligence, the Committee decided that criminal
negligence will be sufficient for any other material elements. 127 For example, if
burglary requires breaking and entering the dwelling of another during the
nighttime with the purpose of committing a felony, the elements of breaking,
entering, dwelling and during the nighttime would be satisfied if the defendant
was reckless with regard to their existence.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE

119.
120.
121.
122.

§ 2.02(3)

(AM LAW INST. 1985). See Wechsler, supra note 103.

Id. § 2.05(1).
Id. § 2.05; Minutes, supranote 41 (Aug. 8, 2014).
Id. § 2.05 (AM LAW INST. 1985).
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-87 (2017).

123. "The adverb 'willfully' has such extremes of meaning that it gives no clue to the mens rea
requirement to which it refers if it is considered alone." DONALD A. DRiPPs, RONALD N. BOYCE & ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMINALLA WAND PROCEDURE 758 (13thed. 2018).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (AM LAW INST. 1985). See Wechsler, supra note 103.
125. See id.

§ 2.02(4).

This is the original version of the

§ 2.02(4)

that the Committee did not adopt:

(4) Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the law defining an
offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without
distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of
the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
See Wechsler, supra note 103.
126. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Sept. 8, 2006).
127. See Wechsler, supra note 103.
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Section 2.02(5) clarifies that if the defendant's state of mind is more serious
than the crime requires (for example, if he acts recklessly when the crime only
requires criminal negligence), he still may be convicted. 12 8 Subsection (9)
clarifies that ignorance of the law is not a defense. 129 Finally subsection (10)
specifies that when the defendant, for example, has the intent to kill but
recklessly believes that he is justified, he will be guilty of the less serious offense
that requires recklessness, rather than the more serious crime that requires
purpose.1 3 0

b. Specific examples of mens reaproblems with the Mississippi Code
As noted, one of the criticisms of the Mississippi Code was that there were
no defined mens rea terms 1 3 1 but also that the mens rea terms used are numerous
and confusing. For example, in homicide alone, the statutes use several
undefined terms. In addition to the more common "willful,"1 3 2 "culpable
negligence," 33 "depraved heart," 134 "deliberate design,"' 3 5 "without
malice," 1 36 and "intentional," 1 37 the homicide provisions also use such terms as
"accident and misfortune," 1 38 "ordinary caution," 1 39 "unlawful intent,"1 40 "not
cruel and unusual,141" "without taking advantage" 42 and "intentional and not
accidental. 143"
While the opinions of the Mississippi Supreme Court have filled in the gaps
on some of these terms, 14 4 these opinions are not always clear or consistent. 14 5
128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (AM LAW INST. 1985). See Wechsler, supra note 103.
129. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). The Committee did make some changes in
the Model Code, mainly with regard to the terminology, adding "criminal" to the term "negligence." In
addition, the Committee made more distinctions between when the state of mind would apply to "elements"
and "material elements" of the crime. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Sept. 6, 2002); see also Wechsler, supra
note 103.

130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
131. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 32.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See MISS. CODE ANN.
See id. § 97-3-47.
See id. § 97-3-19.
See id.
See id. § 97-3-27.
See id. § 97-3-25.
See id. § 97-3-17.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

§ 97-3-41

(2017).

144. See Hoffheimer, supra note 69, at 112-114.
145. See id; see, e.g., Swanagan v. State, 229 So. 3d 698, 704 (Miss. 2017), (Depraved heart murder is
a killing "done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart,
regardless of human life, although without any premeditateddesign to effect the death of any particular
individual. . . ." [citation omitted] Depraved-heart murder encompasses "a reckless and eminently dangerous
act directed toward a single individual." [citation omitted]. A finding of malice is not requiredfor depravedheart murder. [citation omitted; emphasis added] Depraved-heart murder encompasses 'a reckless and
eminently dangerous act directed toward a single individual."' [citation omitted] A finding of malice is not
required for depraved-heart murder." Depraved heart murder is the very essence of malice. [emphasis added]).
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Part of the goal of an acceptable Penal Code is to publish as much of the law as
possible in the Code to serve as notice to the public of what is prohibited and
what is allowed. 14 6 Leaving the explanation of the law to varying court opinions
and the common law creates confusion and unjust results.
The sections that apply to excuse and justification are particularly
problematic in that they do not express a sufficiently serious state of mind.
While the Model Code requires at least criminal negligence to be guilty of a
crime, 14 7 Section 97-2-17, the main Mississippi statute on excusable homicide,
uses the terms "accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means,
with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent."1 48 Thus,
presumably one who is merely negligent would not be allowed to claim excuse.
Similarly, justification is set out in Section 97-3-15, and there are no words
regarding criminal intent. The statute instead discusses homicide "necessarily
committed," which is not unreasonable under the circumstances, 14 9 further
describing justifiable homicide as "reasonable" and "reasonable ground to
apprehend a design to commit a felony or do some great personal injury."1 50 In
addition, the force used must be "reasonable." All of these references to
"reasonableness" suggest that if the defendant is unreasonable or merely
negligent, he will lose the defense of justification.151 The Model Code was
designed to avoid such a result.
The Model Code scheme allows the defendant to claim the justification
defense when he honestly believes that he had to act. 152 If he is criminally
negligent or reckless in his belief that his act was justified or excused, he may be
guilty of crimes requiring criminal negligence or recklessness, such as
manslaughter 53 or negligent homicide. 154 The contribution made by the Model
Code is best illustrated by comparing Mississippi's criminal homicide statutes to
the much simpler Model Code scheme.
B. CriminalHomicide
The Model Code greatly simplified homicide by defining the mens rea
necessary to commit it.155 Causing the death of another person is criminal
homicide if committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, and
constitutes murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide. 156 The Committee
agreed with this statute, except that, again, we clarified that "negligence" is
''criminal negligence," and we also added provisions for capital murder and
146. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1432.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-17 (2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Bell v. State, 207 So. 2d. 518, 529-530 (Miss. 1949).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
See id. § 210.3.
See id. § 210.4.

155. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1445-46.
156. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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killing of an unborn child, as discussed more fully below. 157
1. Murder
a. Historically
The common-law version of murder classified criminal homicide as either
murder or manslaughter. Murder under the common law was "unlawful killing
of another human being with 'malice aforethought.'" 5 8 Despite a variety of
meanings given to the term "malice aforethought," the term generally
encompassed three mental states regarding the death of another person: intent to
kill, intent to a cause "grievous bodily harm,"1 59 and depraved-heart murder,
which was variously described as an unintentional homicide "under
circumstances evincing an abandoned and malignant heart."1 60 Depraved-heart
murder is often described as exhibiting a "'wanton and willful disregard of an
unreasonable human risk"' or a "'wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart,
cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty;'""61
none of which is very helpful. There is a fourth situation recognized as sufficient
for murder, a death that occurs while the defendant was in the commission of an
inherently dangerous felony.1 62
An early departure from the common law divided murder into two
degrees.1 63 First degree murder was deserving of the death penalty, while the
highest penalty for second degree was life imprisonment.1 64 First-degree murder
was murder perpetrated willfully, deliberately and with premeditation.1 6 5 Courts
often had problems explaining the differences among the three terms, and they
were often abbreviated to cover any intentional murder. 16 6 Killings in the
commission of certain felonies, usually burglary, arson, kidnapping, rape and
robbery, were added to the first-degree murder category, as was killing by certain

157. Minutes, supranote 41 (Nov. 10, 2017); id. (Jan. 13, 2018).
The Committee proposes the following statute for criminal homicide. The differences between the Model Code
and the proposals for homicide are in italics, most of which was taken from the current Mississippi statutes:

§ 210.1

Criminal Homicide

(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he causes the death of another human being purposely,
knowingly, or criminally negligently, or under circumstances defined in § 210.2(1)(b) or 210.3(1)(e) or(f).
(2) Criminalhomicide is capitalmurder, murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.
(3) An indictmentfor murder or capitalmurder shallserve as notice to the defendant that the indictment may
include any and all lesser included offenses thereof including, but not limited to, manslaughterand criminally
negligent homicide.
158. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 13-14 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

159.
160.
161.
162.

See
See
See
See

id. cmt. at 14-15.
id.
id.
id.

163. See id. cmt. at 16.

164. See id.
165. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1446.

166. See id.
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means, such as poison and torture. 167 How was all this translated into the law in
Mississippi?
b. CurrentMississippiLaw
The current Mississippi criminal homicide statutes are particularly
worrisome. In 2013, the Mississippi Legislature amended Section 97-3-21,
which, among other things, divided murder into first and second degree.1 6 8
Dividing murder into two degrees is consistent with the historical and majority
practice.1 69 However, the difference between first and second-degree murder is
traditionally that first-degree murder is eligible for the death penalty, while the
penalty for second-degree murder is life imprisonment.1 70 Under Mississippi
law, the jury may impose a life sentence for both first and second-degree murder.
However, in the case of second-degree murder, if the jury is unable to agree on a
life sentence, the judge may impose a sentence of between twenty and forty
years. Mississippi has a different scheme for deciding whether the death penalty
is appropriate, as noted below. The Committee retained the distinction between
first and second-degree murder to the extent that it was possible while remaining
consistent with the Model Code.171
Mississippi departs from the traditional view in several other respects. First
-degree murder in Mississippi is murder committed by "deliberate design,"
which roughly comports with the Model Code's criminal homicide committed
"purposely." 72 One obvious problem is that the defendant could also commit
manslaughter purposely, but in the heat of passion. "Depraved -heart" murder is
second-degree murder, again without any exception for manslaughter, which also
might be committed with a "depraved heart," depending on what that means.1 7 3
Furthermore, capital murder in Mississippi is punished with death, life without
parole or life with parole.1 7 4 The current Mississippi statute then lists the
occasions for capital murder, which include only some of the homicides
traditionally denominated as first degree and eligible for the death penalty.1 7 5
The most obvious departure is that murder that is "willful, deliberate and
premeditated" is not listed among the possibilities for capital murder. 17 6 Thus
"Deliberate design" murder is not capital murder, as opposed to most statutory
schemes that assign a possibility of the death penalty for "willful, deliberate and

167. See id.
168. 2013 Bill Text MS H.B. 365.
169. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 39,

§

14.7.

170. See 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.7 (3d ed. 2017).
171. As noted earlier, there are no degrees of individual crimes under the Model Code, instead there are
crimes of similar seriousness grouped for purposes of punishment into first, second and third-degree felonies.
Also, as noted, the Committee added a group of fourth-degree felonies. See supra discussion accompanying
notes 59-70.
172. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 20-21 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

173. Id. Miss CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (2017).
174. Id. Id. at § 97-3-21(3).
175. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2) (2017).
176. Id.; see supranote 165.
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premeditated murder."1 7 7 Instead, the Mississippi statute uses such categories as
murder of certain public officials, multiple murders, certain felony murders,
murders by one serving a life sentence, using an explosive device, murder for
hire, and murder on educational property.1 7 8 The Mississippi statute retained the
idea that killing in the commission of any felony is felony murder, denominating
it as murder in the first degree, which again does not determine whether the
death penalty will be imposed. However, a killing in the commission of the
following felonies is capital murder and eligible for the death penalty: "rape,
kidnapping, burglary, arson, robbery, sexual intercourse with any child under
twelve (12), or),

. .

. nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind,"1

79

or

felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section
97-5-39"180 or in any attempt to commit such felonies. 18 1 The Committee

recommended no change to the current scheme for capital murder, but clarified
the statutory scheme for murder otherwise. 182

177. See id. § 97-3-19(1)(d); see also supra discussion accompanying notes 163-65.
178. Id. § 97-3-19(2)(a).

§ 97-3-19(2)(e).
§ 97-3-19(2)(f).
at § 97-3-19(2)(e)

179. Id. Id. at
180. Id. Id. at

181. Id. Id.
and (f).
182. Minutes, supranote 41 (Oct. 3, 1997); id. (and Nov. 10, 2017).

126

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37:2

c. Under the Model Penal Code and the Committee's Proposalsto
Incorporate, Clarify and Improve CurrentMississippiLaw. 18 3

183. This final version of the statutory scheme for murder adopted by the Committee is a combination of
the Model Code and the current Mississippi statutes. The differences from the Model Code are in italics, most
of which are derived from the current Mississippi statutes. Major parts of the statute will be discussed more

fully below.

§ 210.2 Murder
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder, a felony of the first degree, when it is committed:
(a) purposely or knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life; or
(b) by any person engaged in the commission or attempted commission of any inherently dangerousfelony
other than those set forth in § 210.3(1)(e) or (f).
(2) Murder, other than capitalmurder, shall be punished as follows:
(a) By a life sentence, if committed purposely or knowingly or in the commission of an inherently dangerous
felony.
(b) If committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, by:
(i) a life sentence, if sofixed by the jury; or
(ii) twenty to forty years, if the jury fails to agree on a life sentence.
(c) As manslaughter, ifthe defendant proves, by a preponderanceof the evidence, that the defendant committed
the homicide in the heat ofpassionfor which there is adequateprovocation. The adequacy of such provocation
shall be determinedfrom the viewpoint of a reasonableperson in the defendant's situation.
The differences between the Committee's adoption of § 210.3 and the current Mississippi capital murder statute
are underlined and stricken, as follows:

§ 210.3

CapitalMurder

(1) Criminalhomicide constitutes capitalmurder in the following cases:
(a) murderwhihthatis perpetratedby killing apeace officer or fireman while such officer orfireman is acting
in his official capacity or by reason of an actperformed in his official capacity, and with knowledge that the
victim was a peace officer orfireman. Forpurposes of this p
gfhsu,
the term "eace officer" means
any state orfederal law enforcement officer, including, but not limited to, afederalpark ranger, the sheriffof
or police officer of a city or town, a conservation officer, a parole officer, ajudge, senior statusjudge, special
judge, district attorney, legal assistantto a districtattorney, county prosecuting attorney or any other court
official, an agent of the Alcoholic Beverage ControlDivision of the Department ofRevenue, an agent of the
Bureau of Narcotics,personnel of the MississippiHighway Patrol, and the employees of the Department of
Correctionswho are designatedas peace officers by the Commissioner of Correctionspursuant to § 4 7-5-54,
and the superintendentand his deputies, guards, officers and other employees of the MississippiState
Penitentiary;
(b)murderwIethatisperpetrated
by a person who is under sentence of life imprisonment;
(c)murderwhichthatisperpetratedby use or detonation of a bomb or explosive device;
(d)murderwhichthatis perpetratedby any person who has been offered or has received anything of value for
committing the murder, and allparties to such a murder, are guilty aspf4fieipelaccomplices;
(e) when done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime
of rape of a child under 213.2(1) and (2), burglary under 221.1(2)(a) and (b) kidnappingunder 212.1,
arson under 220.1(1), robbery under 222.1, or aggravatedsexual battery under 213.3 of
wim
( fd- or in any attemptto commit suchfelonies;
(f)when done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime
of fc::::,, ;
: :
;:
e//r;Alhild abuse, in violation of sub§ (2) off§ 97-5-9230 I or in any
attempt to commit suchfelony;
(g)murderwhichthatis perpetratedon educationalproperty as defined in § 97-37-17;

S

S

S

S

S

S

(h) murder whc4that is perpetratedby the killing of any elected official of a county, municipal, state orfederal
government with knowledge that the victim was such public official;
(i)murder of three (3) or more persons who are killed incident to one (1) act, scheme, course of conduct or
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i). Simple Murder
The Model Code abandoned the first and second-degree distinction in favor
of a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 184 some version of which
eventually became mandatory for death penalty cases. 185 Criminal homicide is
murder under the Model Code if it is committed purposely or knowingly or
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life." 1 86 This scheme roughly codifies and clarifies the common law,
which defined murder as when the defendant was acting with malice, generally
defined as intent to kill, intent to inflict serious bodily injury or acting with a
depraved heart without justification, excuse, or mitigation.1 87
In the Model Code, the state of mind of "purposefulness" takes the place of
"intent to kill," so that murder is defined as criminal homicide18 8 committed
purposely or knowingly. Knowledge that the result is practically certain is
sufficiently akin to purpose to justify being classified with purposeful murder. 18 9
The Model Code defines the depraved-heart state of mind as extreme
recklessness, requiring that the defendant be consciously aware of and disregard
the risk of death to such a degree that he is acting with extreme indifference to
the value of human life. 190 This is rather easier to understand than the flowery
common-law version of depraved-heart murder. 19 1 Intent to inflict grievous
bodily injury was recognized by the Model Code as a type of extremely reckless
murder, so it was unnecessary to continue it as a separate category.1 9 2 The
Committee adopted this part of the Model Code's definition of murder, as
follows: 193

criminalepisode; or
()murder of more than three (3) persons within a three-yearperiod.
(2) Every person who shall be convicted of capitalmurder shall be sentenced to:
(a) death;
(b) imprisonmentfor life in the State Penitentiarywithoutparole; or
(c) imprisonmentfor life in the State Penitentiarywith eligibilityfor parole as provided in
These two statutes will replace
supranote 41 (Jan. 2018).

§ 97-3-19

through

§ 97-3-23

§ 47-7-3(1)(f.

for the final revision and approval. See Minutes,

184. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1446-47.

185. Id.
186. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
187. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 170, § 14.2.
188. The definition of murder under the Model Code also excludes extreme emotional disturbance
manslaughter, the Model Code's version of voluntary manslaughter. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at

46-47 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
189. MODEL PENAL CODE
190. Id. § 210.3.

§ 210.2(1)(a)

(AM LAW INST. 1985).

191. "[W]anton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk" or a "wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty[.]" MODEL

PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt at 13-14 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
192. See id. § 210 cmt. at 28.
193. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Nov. 10, 2017).
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Section 210.2 Murder
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder, a felony of the first
degree, when it is committed:
(a) purposely or knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or
In the next form of murder, felony murder, the prosecution does not have to
prove that the defendant was acting purposely, knowingly, or with an extreme
degree of recklessness.
ii). Felony Murder
The Model Code eliminates the automatic guilt of criminal homicide if the
defendant is committing any felony or misdemeanor, which Mississippi retains.
The Model Code recognizes that if the defendant is in the commission of certain
listed crimes that endanger lives, 194 there is a presumption that he is acting
recklessly with extreme indifference to the value of human life. 195 However,
this presumption is rebuttable under the Model Code. The rebuttable nature of
the presumption was accepted by only a few jurisdictions.1 96 The Committee
agreed that the presumption should not be rebuttable, which is consistent with
current Mississippi law. 19 7 The Committee also did not limit the felony-murder
presumption to certain listed felonies, as did the Model Code, but rather applied
the presumption to any inherently dangerous felony, as follows: 19 8
Section 210.2 Murder
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder, a felony of the first
degree, when it is committed:

(b) by any person engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of any inherently dangerous felony other than those
set forth in Section 210.3(1)(e) or (f).1 99

194. Robbery, sexual attack, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. MODEL PENAL CODE

210.2(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
195. See id. § 210 cmt. at 6.
196. See id. § 210.1 cmt. at 8.
197. Minutes, supranote 41 (Oct. 3, 1997).
198. Minutes, supranote 41 (Sept. 5, 1997).

199. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3(e) and (f) (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2015) (This
section lists particular inherently dangerous felonies for capital murder. Supra note 183.)

§
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Even before the Model Code, most jurisdictions limited the felony murder
rule in some way to avoid unjust results, such as a killing in the commission of a
felony where danger to life was unforeseen. For this reason, the felony murder
rule was either limited by most jurisdictions to certain dangerous felonies,
felonies committed in a dangerous way, or to inherently dangerous felonies. 20 0
Inherently dangerous felonies usually include burglary, arson, rape, robbery, and
kidnapping, but there may be others, such as shooting into an occupied dwelling.
201

Thus, if the underlying felony is not inherently dangerous, the crime would
not be automatically murder under the felony murder rule. For example, if a
seller makes a felonious sale of liquor, and the buyer drinks it, passes out and
dies of exposure, the crime would not be felony murder. The prosecution would
have to prove that the seller was at least extremely reckless that the sale of the
alcohol would cause death. 202 The Committee decided to reject the current
Mississippi language applying the rule to any felony, but to retain the felony
murder rule for inherently dangerous felonies, which is likely the most common
view. 203 Limiting the rule to inherently dangerous felonies prevents unjust
results and is consistent with the view that the defendant's state of mind should
be sufficiently serious to merit punishment for a first-degree felony.
The Committee's proposal also rejects the Model Code's view of limiting
the rule to certain felonies. 2 04 This view of felony murder also allows for
development of the law so that the courts may decide to apply the rule to other
felonies determined to be inherently dangerous. 20 5
Turning to distinctions between the kinds of murder that justify the most
serious penalty, we will now discuss penalties and capital murder.
iii). Penalties for Murder and Capital Murder
The Model Code does not divide murder into degrees, as do most states, 20 6
including Mississippi, after the 2013 changes. 207 The Committee dealt with the
formerly first and second-degree division, adopted in 2013 and discussed
above, 2 08 as follows:

Section 210.2 Murder

200. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 170,
201. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 170,

§ 14.5(a) & (b).
§ 14.5(b).

202. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 cmt. at 32 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
203. See generally LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 39, § 14.5.
204. Minutes, supranote 41 (Sept. 5, 1997).
205. For example, the court could decide that selling certain dangerous drugs could be inherently
dangerous, in addition to the usual inherently dangerous felonies, burglary, arson, rape, robbery and
kidnapping. Other obvious additions could be such statutory felonies as shooting into an occupied dwelling.
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 cmt. at 70 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
207. At the time the committee considered criminal homicide, Mississippi did not have degrees of
murder, as it has since 2013. See supraSection V.B. 1.b.

208. See id.
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(2) Murder, other than capital murder, shall be punished as
follows:
(a) By a life sentence, if committed purposely or knowingly or in
the commission of an inherently dangerous felony.
(b) If committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life, by:
(i) a life sentence, if so fixed by the jury; or
(ii) twenty to forty years, if the jury fails to agree on a
life sentence.
Under the Model Code, the death penalty is possible for any kind of
murder, including depraved-heart murder referred to above, 209 which would not
be possible now in Mississippi. 2 10 The Model Code substituted a list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered in determining
whether the defendant should get the death penalty. 2 1 1 Consideration of such
factors is now mandatory in all jurisdictions for imposition of the death
penalty. 2 12
The Committee decided to retain the Mississippi Code's current scheme for
capital murder, so that to get the death penalty, the murder must still be one of
those listed in the capital murder section. 2 13
The next most serious form of criminal homicide is not denominated
murder, but it carries the same penalties: the killing of an unborn child, which
will be discussed next.
iii) Killing of an Unborn Child
The Committee also adopted a statute protecting the unborn. The statute
tracks the current Mississippi law that provides that if the actor is assaulting the
mother and the fetus dies or is injured as a result, the death of the unborn child is
punished as a separate felony. 2 14 The actor is guilty of a first degree felony if he
209. See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.2

cmt. at 70.

210. MISS CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (2017).
211. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
212. See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1446-47. See MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-19 (2017)

version of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
213. The Capital Murder statute is reproduced supranote 183, proposed section

for Mississippi's

§ 210.3.

214. This is the statute that the Committee is proposing.

§ 210.7

Killing of an Unborn Child; Serious Bodily Injury to an Unborn Child; Bodily Injury to an Unborn

Child
(1) A person is guilty of an offense
(a) if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or criminally negligently causes the death of an unborn child by
committing an assault against the mother.
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purposely or knowingly causes the death; a second degree felony is he recklessly
causes the death; and a third degree felony if he criminally negligently causes the
death. If he commits an aggravated assault against the mother, which results in
the death of the unborn child, he is guilty of a third-degree felony whether he is
aware of the pregnancy or not. If a perpetrator kills an unborn child purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or criminally negligently, in some manner other than
committing an assault against the mother or legal abortion, he is guilty of a thirddegree felony. 2 15
Murder is the most serious form of criminal homicide, but the law
recognized early on that not all forms of criminal homicides should be treated the
same as murder. The less serious forms of criminal homicide, manslaughter and
negligent homicide, will now be discussed.
2. Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent Homicide
a. Historicallyand under the Model Penal Code
Under the early English common law, if a defendant could read, he could
claim "benefit of clergy," since at one time only priests could read. The
defendant would then be tried in the ecclesiastical courts, which did not impose
the death penalty. Even if he could not read, he could memorize the passage
from the Bible that served as the literacy test.2 16 Eventually this practice lead to
the division of criminal homicide into murder, which justified the death penalty,
and manslaughter, which did not. 2 17 As noted above, murder was committed
with malice aforethought, and every other homicide that was not excused or
justified was manslaughter. 2 18
Manslaughter was eventually divided into two categories: voluntary and
(b) The offense is:
(i) a first degree felony if he purposely or knowingly causes the death;
(ii) a second degree felony if he recklessly causes the death;
(iii) a third degree felony if he criminally negligently causes the death.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he causes the death of an unborn child by committing an
aggravated assault against the mother. Mistake of fact that the woman is not pregnant is no defense under this
subsection.
(3) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or criminally negligently
causes serious bodily injury to the unborn child.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the prosecution of any person for conduct relating to:
(a) any legal medical procedure performed by a licensed physician or other licensed medical professional,
including legal abortions, when done at the request of a mother of an unborn child or the mother's legal
guardian; or
(b) the lawful dispensing or administration of lawfully prescribed medication.
For the purposes of this section, the term unborn child means a human being at any stage of development from
conception until live birth who is carried in the womb.
215. This statute will replace Miss. CODE ANN.
statute that would prohibit causing or aiding suicide.
216. See Hoffheimer, supra note 69, at 50 n.37.
217. See MODEL PENAL CODE

218. Id.

§ 210.3

§ 97-3-37

(2017). The Committee is still working on a

cmt. at 44 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter is homicide that would otherwise be
murder except that it was committed in the heat of passion, based on adequate
provocation or when the defendant's belief that he had to kill in self-defense was
unreasonable. 2 19 Involuntary manslaughter was unintentional criminal homicide
that was not sufficiently culpable to rise to the level of the depraved heart state of
mind necessary for murder or voluntary manslaughter. 22 0 Also included in
involuntary manslaughter was a killing in the commission of a malum in se
misdemeanor, or misdemeanor manslaughter. 22 1
The Model Code recognizes all these concepts, except for misdemeanor
manslaughter, but in somewhat different order. As noted above, the Model Code
classifies murder as a first-degree felony. As for criminal homicide that is not
murder, the Model Code classifies such homicide into two categories:
manslaughter, which is a second-degree felony, 22 2 and negligent homicide,
which is a third-degree felony. 22 3
The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, recognized in Mississippi, was
abandoned altogether by the Model Code, so that a killing in the commission of a
misdemeanor is not automatically manslaughter. 2 24 Proof of a criminally
homicidal state of mind is required. As opposed to a killing in the commission
of an inherently dangerous felony that contemplates danger to persons, a killing
in the commission of a misdemeanor rarely contemplates danger of causing the
death of persons, so the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule could lead to
unforeseen and unjust results. 2 25 The Committee agreed with this position and
did not include the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule in its proposed revision. 22 6
There are two types of manslaughter under the Model Code, one of which is
a criminal homicide committed recklessly. 227 As opposed to the prior law that
lumped criminal homicide, whether committed criminally negligently or
recklessly, into the category of involuntary manslaughter, the Model Code
recognizes that a person who is conscious of the risk should be punished more
severely. 22 8
As noted earlier, recklessness requires that the defendant be consciously
aware of the great risk he was running in engaging in the conduct that caused the
death. 22 9 While mere recklessness is insufficient for depraved heart murder,
which requires an extreme indifference to the value of human life, 23 0

219. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 170, §§15.1, 15.2(b), 15.3(a).
220. Id.
221. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 cmt. at 75-76 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Malum in se is the equivalent
of the concept of a true crime discussed earlier. See supra discussion accompanying notes 38-39.

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. § 210.3.
Id. § 210.4.
See id. § 210 cmt. at 77.
Id.

226. Minutes, supranote 41 (Nov. 7, 1997).

227. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
228. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 52-53 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
229. See supra discussion accompanying notes 108-09.
230. See supra discussion accompanying notes 189-92.
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recklessness is sufficiently serious to justify a more severe punishment than a
criminal homicide committed when the defendant's actions merely fall
substantially below a reasonable-person standard. 231
The second type of manslaughter is considered by the Model Code to be of
similar seriousness to reckless manslaughter. This type of manslaughter is what
the common law termed "voluntary manslaughter based on adequate
provocation." Both forms of criminal homicide are classified as manslaughter, a
second-degree felony. 2 32 The Committee adopted the Model Code's version of
reckless manslaughter but made changes in the Model Code's version of heat-ofpassion manslaughter. 23 3
The Model Code's version of heat of passion manslaughter differs from the
common law in that the common law utilized an objective standard. The only
subjective factor considered was whether the defendant was in fact acting in the
heat of passion. The adequacy of the provocation was viewed from the
standpoint of a reasonable person, as was whether a reasonable person would
have had time to cool. 23 4 The Model Code drafters believed that some form of
conscious awareness is necessary to justify the second-degree penalty, so the
Model Code viewed this type of manslaughter more subjectively.
The
Committee did not fully agree with this position, as noted below.
To avoid the common-law baggage attached to heat-of-passion
manslaughter, the Model Code used the term manslaughter "under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse." 23 5 "Extreme emotional disturbance," however, has the same meaning as
"heat of passion" under the common law, 23 6 both of which encompass any
serious disturbance of emotion, usually requiring some form of anger, fear or
grief.237 The Model Code and the common law diverge at this point by virtue of
the Model Code's addition of the following language: "the reasonableness of
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be." 2 38 In
other words, the jury must consider the defendant's subjective viewpoint and
decide whether the explanation is reasonable from his point of view, as opposed
to the common law that did not consider the defendant's subjective situation or
belief at all. The Committee did not adopt this part of the Model Code, retaining
the reasonable person standard for whether the provocation was reasonable. 239
231. See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.3

cmt. at 52-53.

232. See id. at 43.
233. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Oct. 6, 1997).
234. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 59 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

235.
236.
237.
238.

See
See
See
See

id. § 210.3 cmt. at 64.
id. § 210.3 cmt. at 60.
id.
id. § 62.

239. Under § 210.2, the Committee added that "It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this §
[the murder statute] that the defendant committed the homicide in the heat of passion for which there is
adequate provocation. The adequacy of the provocation shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person in the defendant's situation. Heat of passion for which there is adequate provocation mitigates murder
to manslaughter."] Id. § 210.2. § 210.3 provides that "criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter, a felony in
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The other major provocation under the common law that mitigated murder
to manslaughter was unreasonable belief self-defense and other similar situations
in which the homicide would have been excused but for the defendant's
unreasonable belief that he had to act in self-defense. 240 As noted earlier, the
drafters of the Model Penal Code were intent upon avoiding assessment of
liability when a defendant was merely negligent. 24 1 For this reason the Model
Code's scheme for dealing with unreasonable belief is somewhat convoluted.
The defendant may claim self-defense or justification, if he honestly believes that
he is justified in committing the act. If he is criminally negligent or reckless, he
may be guilty of a crime requiring those states of mind. 24 2 Thus, for example if
he believes that he must kill in self-defense, and his belief is reckless, he may be
guilty of reckless manslaughter. 243 This form of manslaughter is a seconddegree felony and is as serious as extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter,
the analog of voluntary manslaughter by heat of passion under the common
law. 24 4 If the defendant was criminally negligent, he may be guilty of negligent
homicide, a third-degree felony and the Model Code equivalent of involuntary
manslaughter under the common law. 245
3. How do the common law and Model Code schemes compare to Mississippi
law?
a. Mississippi
Mississippi dropped the common-law voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter dichotomy and instead has many statutes describing various kinds
of manslaughter. Some of these statutes are unusual, to put it kindly, and others
conflict with each other and the murder statutes. For example, under Section 973-19, a killing in the commission of any felony is first-degree murder, and
certain listed felonies are worthy of the death penalty, 24 6 yet under Section 97-327, a killing in the commission of a felony other than the felonies listed in the
death-penalty statute is manslaughter. 2 47
Then there are some unusual types of manslaughter, such as manslaughter

the second degree, when: ... it is committed under the circumstances defined by § 210(1)(a) Heat of passion
for which there is adequate provocation mitigates murder to manslaughter and need not be proven in any
prosecution under this §." Id § 210.3. Adding "viewpoint of the defendant's situation" allows the courts to
consider whether the defendant's blindness and other physical characteristics and other similar characteristics
should be considered in the reasonable person test.
240. Other similar situations would be reasonable belief that the victim was a fleeing felon for use of
force in law enforcement or unreasonable-belief killing of an enemy in warfare, for example. Situations that
would otherwise be justified or excused except for the unreasonable belief See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3
cmt. at 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See id § 210.3 cmt. at 53.
See id.
See id. § 210.3 cmt. at 50-5 1.
See id. § 210.3 cmt. at 44.
See id. § 210.3 cmt. at 81.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (2017).
Id. § 97-3-27.
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by a drunken doctor, 24 8 by overloading a boat, 249 by "ignorant or negligent
management of a steamship or railroad," 2 50 and by "allowing a dangerous animal
to be at large." 2 5 1 Some of these statutes ostensibly only require the defendant to
be negligent, which should never be the basis for criminal liability, as discussed
above. 2 52 All of these should be forms of manslaughter by criminally negligent
homicide, if the killing occurs when the defendant is criminally negligent. This
may be covered by one statute adapted from the Model Code.2 53
When the defendant is not a drunken doctor or a careless steamboat
operator, and so forth, there is a general Mississippi statute that covers
manslaughter by "culpable negligence." 2 54 Caselaw usually defines culpable
negligence as something akin to recklessness under the Model Code. 255 Thus
there is no statute to generally cover situations in which the defendant is
criminally negligent. In other words, the defendant kills under circumstances in
which he has fallen greatly below the standard of a reasonable person but is not
consciously aware that he has done so. As noted above, while the issue is not
free from debate, it is usually considered desirable to hold defendants to some
normative standard, so they may not claim ignorance of such norms. 25 6
However, it is unjust for a defendant to be guilty of any form of criminal
homicide or other true crime when he is merely negligent or when no reasonable
person would foresee death as a result of his conduct, which is possible now in
Mississippi.
Section 97-3-29 contains the much-criticized misdemeanor manslaughter
rule. 2 57 The statute applies to a killing in the commission of any misdemeanor,
but at least does limit the misdemeanors to those recognized at common law. 25 8
Theoretically, the misdemeanor then must at least be malum in se (a true crime)
and not a regulatory offense, as recognized at common law. 25 9 This still leaves
the door open to the possibility of some unforeseen death in the commission of a
misdemeanor being automatic manslaughter. 260
For example, one of the crimes that is arguably subject to the misdemeanor
manslaughter rule is trespass. Whether trespass is a true crime could be
debated, 2 6 1 but a killing which occurs when the actor is trespassing could be
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 97-3-39.
§ 97-3-41.
§ 97-3-43.
§ 97-3-45.

252. See supra discussion accompanying notes 94-96.

253. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
254. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-47 (2017).
255. CompareHoffheimer, supranote 69, at 130-131 with MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 202(1)(c) (AM.

INST. 1985).
256. See supra discussion accompanying notes 94-96.
257. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-29 (2017). See supradiscussion accompanying note 89.

258. Id. § 97-3-29.
259. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
260. See id. § 210 cmt. at 75-77.
261. The question is whether trespass is malum in se or malum prohibitum. See supra discussion
accompanying notes 38-39 & 257-60.
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misdemeanor manslaughter in Mississippi. As an aside, Mississippi has a special
manslaughter statute for the "involuntary" killing of a trespasser, if
unintentionally and "by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of
another." 26 2
Generally, involuntary manslaughter is punished less severely than
voluntary manslaughter. 2 63 Involuntary manslaughter under the common law is
criminal homicide committed recklessly or criminally negligently, while
voluntary manslaughter is committed with the same state of mind as murder, but
with some mitigation, usually by the rule of provocation (which includes the heat
of passion) or unreasonable belief self-defense. 264 As noted, there is no such
dichotomy in Mississippi. All manslaughter is punished with a fine of $500 and
from one year in the county jail to two to twenty years in prison. 26 5
The only manslaughter statute that covers what would be called voluntary
manslaughter at common law requires that the defendant not be acting with
malice (which is required for murder under the common law, but not in
Mississippi) and in the heat of passion, "in a cruel and unusual manner," or "by
the use of a dangerous weapon," "without authority of law, and not in necessary
self-defense." 2 66
Again, Mississippi's version of common law voluntary manslaughter is
punished the same as other forms of manslaughter. 267 The only form of
manslaughter punished more severely is the killing of a child, for which the
perpetrator may be imprisoned for thirty years. 2 68 Obviously, punishing the
most serious form of manslaughter the same as the least serious form of
manslaughter, which would be criminally negligent homicide under the proposed
scheme, could lead to very serious injustice and disproportionate punishment or
lack thereof. Punishing the various types of manslaughter more fairly is only
one of the improvements the Committee's proposed changes would make.
c. The Committee's Proposals
The Committee adopted the Model Code's version of reckless
manslaughter, but as noted earlier, changed manslaughter based on heat of
passion. The Committee retained the reasonable person standard for determining
the adequacy of the provocation but did temper it with language that considers
the "viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation." The Committee
intended for the law to be allowed to develop regarding what issues will be
considered for the defendant's situation. The proposed manslaughter statute is as
follows:

262. MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-33

263. See MODEL PENAL CODE

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

(2017).

§ 210.3

cmt. at 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 170, §§ 15.2, 15.4.
MISS. CODE ANN. 97-3-25 (2017).
Id. § 97-3-35.
Compare id. with id. § 97-3-25.
Id. § 97-3-25.
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Section 210.4 Manslaughter
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter, a felony of the
second degree, when it is committed:
(a) recklessly; or
(b) under the circumstances defined by Section 210.2 (1)(a), by a
defendant acting in the heat of passion for which there is
adequate provocation. The adequacy of the provocation shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the
defendant's situation.
With regard to Negligent Homicide, the Committee adopted the Model
Code's provision, changing the terminology to "Criminally Negligent
Homicide." 2 69
There are several Mississippi cases that indicate that the
"culpable negligence" required for many forms of criminal homicide is the
equivalent of recklessness under the Model Code. 27 0 With Criminally Negligent
Homicide, the Committee would be adding an objective standard for this least
serious form of homicide to Mississippi law. The Model Code, along with many
jurisdictions, justifies an objective standard for negligent homicide, the least
serious form of criminal homicide, because there should be a normative function
of the criminal code. In other words, again, there should be a standard of
conduct required that no one should be allowed to fall below, even if he is
consciously ignorant of the consequences of his conduct. 27 1 The statute is as
follows:
Section 210.5 Criminally Negligent Homicide
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes criminally negligent homicide
when it is committed criminally negligently.
(2) Criminally negligent homicide is a felony in the third degree.
These two statutes would replace the numerous Mississippi statutes on
manslaughter. 2 72 The proposed manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide
proposals would simplify, clarify and explain these crimes. There is almost no
place where this change is more needed than, as seen above, in Mississippi's
current manslaughter statutes. Again, under current Mississippi law, voluntary
manslaughter is punished the same as other forms of manslaughter. 273 The only
form of manslaughter punished more severely is the killing of a child, for which
269. See Minutes, supra note 41 (Mar. 9, 2018).
270. See Hoffheimer, supra note 69, at 130-13 1.
271. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 59 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
272. These two statutes would replace

§§

273. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 (2017).

97-3-25 through 97-3-47.
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the perpetrator may be imprisoned for thirty years. 274 Obviously punishing the
most serious form of manslaughter the same as the least serious form of
manslaughter, which would be criminally negligent homicide under the proposed
scheme, could lead to very serious injustice and disproportionate punishment or
lack thereof.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Committee has been working for more than twenty years to develop a
criminal code that is just, modem, consistent, and fits the needs of Mississippi.
Instituting the changes proposed by the Committee will improve the ranking
among penal codes, but more importantly, these changes will enhance the
administration of justice.
We can all agree that the punishment should fit the crime. If the proposed
changes are adopted, the Mississippi Code will provide that in larger measure.
Citizens will know what conduct is criminally proscribed. Judges will be able to
explain the law to juries more clearly. Juries will be able to understand more
easily the conduct they should determine is proscribed. In short, the
administration of justice will be improved.
In this article, I have used two areas to exemplify the improvements that
could be made. First, defining the states of mind necessary to commit a crime
will greatly improve the fairness of our criminal laws, which should be
dependent on the defendant's state of mind being sufficiently culpable to justify
the punishment he receives. In addition, simplifying and clarifying the homicide
statutes and assigning penalties commensurate with the severity of the offense
will also improve the administration ofjustice in this most important area of law.
In future articles, I will explain the Committee's proposals for changes to
other crimes against the person, such as assault and battery, kidnapping, and sex
crimes.
Then I will discuss arson, burglary, forgery, and theft crimes.
Subsequent articles will explore offenses against the family, such as bigamy and
incest, as well as, bribery, perjury, obstruction of government operations, abuse
of office, disorderly conduct, and crimes against public decency, such as
prostitution.
Mississippi is coming late to the process of reforming the criminal code.
However, many jurisdictions are currently re-considering criminal-justice
reform. This is a good time for instituting changes that would make our criminal
code more consistent and establish penalties that are commensurate with the
severity of the offense, without assigning reflexively long sentences. Mississippi
should reform its penal code now.

274. Id.
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APPENDIX
TABLE OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT PROPOSED

Crime

Punishment

Attempt

Same as target crime, unless target crime
is a First degree felony

Conspiracy

Solicitation

Homicide:
Criminal Homicide
(Murder, Manslaughter,
Feticide, DUI Homicide
(negligent homicide
covers),

Assault

if the target crime is a First degree felony,
Second degree felony
Same as target crime, unless target crime
is a First degree felony
if the target crime is a First degree felony,
Second degree felony
Same as target crime, unless target crime
is a First degree felony
if the target crime is a First degree felony,
Second degree felony
Murder: First degree felony
Manslaughter - Second degree felony
Criminally negligent homicide - Third
degree felony
Killing of unborn child purposely or
knowingly causing the death of a unborn
child by committing an assault against the
mother.- First degree felony
recklessly causing the death of a unborn
child by committing an assault against the
mother.- Second degree felony
criminally negligently causing the death
of a unborn child by committing an assault
against the mother.- Third degree felony
causing the death of a unborn child
committing an aggravated assault against
the mother -Third degree felony
knowingly, recklessly, or criminally
negligent causes the SBI to unborn childThird degree felony
Simple Assault:
Class A misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony: if (a) When acting
within the scope of his duty, office or
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employment at the time of the assault: a
statewide elected official; law
enforcement officer; fireman; emergency
medical personnel; public health
personnel; social worker, family
protection specialist or family protection
worker employed by the Department of
Human Services or another agency;
Division of Youth Services personnel; any
county or municipal jail officer;
superintendent, principal, teacher or other
instructional personnel, school attendance
officer or school bus driver; any member
of the Mississippi National Guard or
United States Armed Forces; a judge of a
circuit, chancery, county, justice,
municipal or youth court or a judge of the
Court of Appeals or a justice of the
Supreme Court; district attorney or legal
assistant to a district attorney; county
prosecutor or municipal prosecutor; court
reporter employed by a court, court
administrator, clerk or deputy clerk of the
court; public defender; or utility worker;
(b) A legislator while the
Legislature is in regular or
extraordinary session or while
otherwise acting within the
scope of his duty, office or
employment; or
(c) A person who is sixtyfive (65) years of age or older
or a person who is a
vulnerable person, as defined
in Section 43-47-5;
(d) A child who is in the
process of boarding or exiting
a school bus and the actor is
in the course of a violation of
Section 63-3-615.]
Aggravated Assault:

2019]

WHY MISSISSIPPI SHOULD REFORMITS PENAL CODE

Domestic Violence
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Second Degree- SBI/ causes such injury
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly
manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life
Third Degree- attempts to cause or
purposely/knowingly causes bodily injury
to another with a deadly weapon.
Assault on police officer a felony,
2a - Second degree felony
2b is Third degree felony.
Simple Domestic Violence:
Class A misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony- if at the time of the
commission of the offense in question, he
has two prior convictions, within 7 years,
for any combination of simple domestic
violence under this subsection or
aggravated domestic violence as defined
in subsection (3) of this section or
substantially simiarl offense.
Aggravated Domestic Violence:
Fourth degree felony
Third degree felony if two he has two (2)
prior convictions within the past seven (7)
years, whether against the same or another
victim, for any combination of aggravated
domestic violence under this subsection or
simple domestic violence, which is
defined as a felony in the fourth degree, as
set forth in Subsection (2) or substantially
similar offenses under the laws of another
state, of the United States, or of a federally
recognized Native American tribe.
Felony in the second degree if has at least
three (3) previous convictions, whether
against the same or different victims, for
any combination of offenses defined in
subsection (3) of this section or
substantially similar offenses under the
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Recklessly Endangering
Another person
Terroristic Threats
Causing and Aiding or
soliciting Suicide
Kidnapping
Aggravated Kidnapping

False Imprisonment
Interference with Custody

Criminal Coercion

[VOL. 37:2

law of another state, of the United States,
or of a federally recognized Native
American tribe.
Class A misdemeanor
Third degree felony
Third degree felony
Third degree felony
First degree felony "unless the defendant
establishes, as an affirmative defense, that
the defendant voluntarily released the
victim without serious bodily injury in a
safe place prior to trial in which case it is a
felony of the second degree."
Class A misdemeanor
Children: Class A misdemeanor "ifhe
knowingly or recklessly takes or entices
any child under the age of 18 from the
custody of its parent, guardian or other
lawful custodian, when he has no privilege
to do so."
Fourth degree felony_"unless the actor, not
being a parent or person in equivalent
relation to the child, acted with knowledge
that his conduct would cause serious alarm
for the child's safety, or in reckless
disregard of a likelihood of causing such
alarm"
Committed persons: Class A misdemeanor
Third degree felony if the actor's purpose
is to commit a felony in the first or second
degree or the actor's purpose is felonious
in the first or second degree
Fourth degree felony if the actor's purpose
is to commit a felony in the third degree
Otherwise Criminal Coercion is a Class A
Misdemeanor.
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Burglary

Indecent Exposure
Rape of Child

Sexual battery
Aggravated sexual battery
Rape
Aggravated rape
Limited Spousal Exclusion;
Spousal Rape
Theft

Robbery
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Second degree in dwelling or (PKorR)
bodily injury or armed
If not third degree
Multiple convictions: first or second
Class A misdemeanor
Under 11, and actor 16 or older first
degree felony
Under 11 and actor under 16 second
degree felony
11-16 and actor 4 years older than victim
and 21 under third/second degree felony
(not sure here says both in different places
July 9, 1999 - second, Sept 10, 1999third)
victim 11-16 actor 21 up second degree
Fourth degree felony
Second degree felony
Second degree felony
First degree felony
Second degree felony
Fourth degree felony if exceeds $1000 or
stolen fire arm or vehicle
Class A misdemeanor: any other theft no
within above definition
Class D misdemeanor: same as above
except was not taken by threat or breach
of fiduciary obligation amount involved
was less than $100
First degree felony - attempts to kill or
purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict sbi
Second degree felony- recklessly inflicts
sbi, threatens with fear of immediate sbi,
commits or threatens immediately to
commit felony of the first or second
Third degree felony - recklessly inflicts
bodily injury, threatens another with or
purposely puts him in fear of immediate
bodily injury, or takes property from
person by force
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Trespass on nuclear
facilities
Criminal Trespass

Arson
Reckless burning or
exploding
Criminal mischief

Causing Catastrophe
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Fourth degree felony - purposely obtains
property of another by threatening to:
inflict sbi or inflict bodily injury, accuse
anyone of a criminal offense, expose any
secret tending to subject any person to
hatred contempt or ridicule or to impair
his credit or business repute or take or
withhold action as an official or cause an
official to take or withhold action or bring
about or continue a strike boycott or other
collective unofficial action, if the property
is not demanded or received for the benefit
of the group in whose interest the actor
purports act or testify or provide
information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal
claim or defense, inflict any other harm
which would not benefit the actor.
Fourth degree Felony
Class D misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor: if committed in a
dwelling at night
Class D misdemeanor: defiant trespasser if
defied an order to leave personally
communicated to him by the owner of the
premises or other authorized persons."
Second degree felony
Third degree felony
Third degree felony - loss excess of $5000
or "a substantial interruption or
impairment of public communication,
transportation, supply of water, gas or
power, or other public service."
Class A misdemeanor- loss of excess of
$100 if "purposefully or recklessly causes
pecuniary loss"
Class D misdemeanor-otherwise
Second degree felony if committed
purposely or knowingly
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Child Abuse Neglect and
delinquency

Child Pornography
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Third degree felony if committed
recklessly
Second degree felony if purposely,
knowingly or recklessly burns, tortures,
mutilates, starves, whips, strikes or
otherwise abuses any child under 13 in
such a manner as to cause bodily injury.
Fourth degree felony if purposely or
knowingly abandons a child under 13 in
such a manner as to cause a substantial
risk of serious bodily injury
Fourth degree felony if failure to report.
Under both parental and other person
knowingly, employs, uses, persuades,
induces, entices or coerces
First degree felony- child less than 11 and
actor is at least 16
Second degree felony-the actor is at least
16
Third degree felony-if the actor is under
16
Knowingly Permits child to engage in
sexually explicit conduct for purpose of
visual depiction::
Third degree felony-child at least 11 but
less than 16 and actor is at least four years
older than victim
Having custody/ control of child
knowingly permits child to engage in
sexually explicit conduct for purpose of
visual depiction:
Third degree felony
Having custody/ control Sells or otherwise
transfers:
Second degree felony
Knowingly makes, prints, or publishes or

causes to be made etc.:
Third degree felony
Knowingly receives, transports, sells,
possesses, reproduces for distribution or
distributes any visual depiction:
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Fourth degree felony
Publicly Displaying
Sexually Oriented Materials
Publicly Displaying
Sexually Oriented Materials
to Children

Disseminating Sexually
Explicit Material to
Children

Bigamy
Hindering Apprehension or
Prosecution

Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor- child is less than
11 yrs old and actor is at least 16
Class B misdemeanor- child is less than 11
yrs and actor is under 16
Class B misdemeanor- child is at least 11
but less than 16 and the actor is at least 21
Knowingly sells written/visual depiction
of sexually explicit conduct:
Class A misdemeanor-child is less than 11
Class A misdemeanor- if actor is at least
16
Class B misdemeanor- if the actor is under
16
Class B- child is at least 11 and actor is
less than 16 and at least four years older
than the victim
For purpose of the sexual stimulation or
gratification of any person, knowingly
dissemination sexually explicit conduct:
Class B misdemeanor-child is at least 11
but less than 16 and actor is at least four
years older than victim
Class A misdemeanor
Third degree felony if the conduct which
the actor knows has been charged or is
liable to be charged against the person
aided would constitute a felony of the first
degree. The offense is a felony in the
fourth degree if the conduct which the
actor knows has been charged or is liable
to be charged against the person aided
would constitute a felony of the second or
third degree.
Otherwise Class A misdemeanor, unless
the offense is a misdemeanor, in which
case it is a Class D misdemeanor
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Aiding Another in Profiting
or Benefiting from a Crime

Escape

Implements for Escape

Bail Jumping

Perjury
Intimidation or Bribery of a
Witnesses
Bribe Receiving by Witness
Tampering with or
Fabricating Physical
Evidence
Tampering with Public
Records or Information
Tampering with Witnesses
False Alarms to Agencies of
Public Safety
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Third degree felony if principal offense
was a felony of the first degree. The
offense is a felony in the fourth degree if
the principal offense was a felony in the
second or third degree; otherwise it is a
class A misdemeanor
Third degree felony: under arrest or
detained for felony, or following
conviction of a felony, force threat deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument used,
public servant, otherwise Class A
misdemeanor.
Class A misdemeanor: if unlawfully
introduces within detention facility/
unlawfully provides inmate w/weapon/tool
etc. which he knows may be useful for
escape.
Class A misdemeanor: if inmate
procures/makes weapon/ tool for escape.
Fourth degree felony- if the weapon tool
other thing is a firearm destructive device
or dangerous weapon
Fourth degree felony - if failed to appear
at the specified time and place where the
appearance was required to answer a
charge of felony
Class A Misdemeanor-otherwise
Third degree felony
Third degree felony
Third degree felony
Fourth degree felony

Class A misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony- if the purpose is to
defraud defined in section 223.6
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony- Second or
subsequent
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Impersonating a Public
Servant

Class A misdemeanor-if falsely pretends
to hold position in the public service
Fourth degree felony- if falsely pretends
to be a law enforcement officer w/intent to
induce another
Class A misdemeanor

Stimulating Objects of
Antiquity, Rarity etc.
Bad Checks
Deceptive Business
Practices
Forgery

Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor

Commercial Bribery
Defrauding Secured
Creditors
Fraud in Insolvency
Defrauding Judgment
Creditors
Receiving Deposits in a
Failing Financial Institution

Class A misdemeanor
Class B misdemeanor

Falsely communicating a
Terrorist Threat
Criminal possession or
manufacture of forgery
device
Fraudulent Destruction,
Removal or Concealment of
Recordable Instruments
Fraudulent use of credit
cards and debit cards
Rigging Publicly Exhibited
Contest
Bribery in Official and
Political Matter
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Third degree felony - money, securities,
stamps, government
Fourth degree felony- will deed, contract,
check, draft, note, etc. otherwise Class A
misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor

Fourth degree felony - if the value of the
property or services secured or sought to
be secured exceeds $500; otherwise Class
A misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony
Third degree felony

Third degree felony

Third degree felony- if exceeds $500
otherwise misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony - professional or
amateur sport etc. game otherwise Class A
misdemeanor
Third degree felony
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Threats and other Improper
Influence in Official and
Political Matters
Retaliation for Past Official
Action
Retaliation Against Witness
Compensation for Past
Official Action
Trading in public Office
Misuse of Official
Information
False Swearing

Unsworn Falsification

False Reports to Law
Enforcement Authorities

Riot; Failure to Disperse

Failure of Disorderly
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Third degree felony- threatened to commit
a crime or made a threat otherwise
misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony- threatened to
commit a felony otherwise misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony - threatened felony
otherwise misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor- if occurs in official
proceeding/ as defined in §241.1(2)
Class D misdemeanor- if one is required
by law to be sworn/affirmed before notary
or other authorized persons.
Class A misdemeanor- if w/purpose to
mislead public servant
Class C misdemeanor- if makes a material
written false statement which he does not
believe to be true on/pursuant to form
bearing notice
Class D misdemeanor- if he makes written
false statement which he does not believe
to be true on/pursuant to form bearing
notice
Class A misdemeanor-falsely
incriminating another
Class A misdemeanor-False information
Class D misdemeanor-Fictious Reports
Fourth degree felony -w/ five or more
others: "substantial risk of causing,
damage to property or physical injury to
person"
Class A Misdemeanor- w/five or more
others "purposely or recklessly cases or
creates a substantial risk or public terror or
harm."
Otherwise Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
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persons to disperse
Unlawful Assembly
Harassment
Stalking
Aggravated stalking

Aggravated Abuse of
Corpse
Desecration of Venerated
Objects
Aggravated Cruelty to
Companion animals
Cruelly injuring livestock
Poisoning animals
Dog fights
Killing or injuring public
service animal; penalty
False Public Alarms
False Alarms to Agencies of
Public Safety
Indecent exposure
Procuring prostitutes
Promoting Prostitution

Class A misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony- third or more
within 5 years
Fourth degree felony- violate restraining
order etc.
Fourth degree felony- violate restraining
order etc.
Third degree felony- previous sex
conviction
Fourth degree felony, unless prior
conviction or victim under 16 then third
degree
Fourth degree felony
Class D misdemeanor
Fourth degree felony
Fourth degree felony
Fourth degree felony
Fourth degree felony
Fourth degree felony- "purposely kills or
seriously injures"
Fourth degree felony- second or more
Fourth degree felony- second or more
Fourth degree felony- second or more
child under 16
Third degree felony- child age 11-18
Second degree felony- child under 11
Fourth degree felony- second conviction
or more
Third degree - child 11-18
Second degree - child under 11
Fourth degree felony- allows use of place
vehicle or extorts etc.
Third degree felon- second conviction or
more

Human trafficking
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Fourth degree felony
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Disseminating Obscenity to
a Minor
Computer Luring of a
Minor
Criminal Facilitation
Unauthorized use of Motor
Vehicles
Resisting arrest or other law
enforcement
Obstructing Administration
of Law or other
Government Function
Compounding
Misapplication of Entrusted
Property and Property of
Government or Financial
Instiution
Securing Execution of
Writings by Deception
Gifts to Public Servants by
Persons Subject to Their
Jurisdiction
Prohibited Offensive
Weapons; Carrying While
Concealed; Use or Attempt
to Use

Possessing Instruments of
Crime
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Third degree felony- child 11-18
Second degree felony- child under 11
Fourth degree felony- second conviction
or more
Fourth degree felony
Fourth degree felony- if offense was first
or second degree
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor

Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor

Class A misdemeanor
Class A misdemeanor

Class B misdemeanor- for the first
conviction
Class A misdemeanor- for any violation
after the first conviction
Fourth degree felony- any violation after
the second or subsequent conviction under
this section
Third degree felony- for any person
convicted of a felony who is subsequently
convicted under this section.
Class A misdemeanor

